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 Introduction 
 
This report details the WRC’s findings and recommendations concerning serious 
allegations of noncompliance with international labor standards, national law, and codes 
of conduct related to the recent announcement by Russell Corporation that it intends to 
close its Jerzees de Honduras plant in Choloma, Honduras, for what it claims are business 
reasons unrelated to its workers’ exercise of their right to freedom of association.   
Russell’s announcement, which comes after a nearly yearlong process, during which the 
WRC has worked with the company to remediate particularly severe violations of 
associational rights, represents one of the most serious challenges yet faced to the 
enforcement of university codes of conduct.   
 
Prior to the closure announcement, the WRC, as part of an ongoing inquiry into code 
compliance at Jerzees de Honduras, had identified persistent violations of workers’ 
associational rights, including multiple threats from management personnel that the 
factory would close because of the decision of workers to exercise their right to unionize. 
The WRC brought these violations to the attention of Russell’s senior management in the 
United States on multiple occasions, but the problems continued. Thus, at the time of the 
closure announcement, on October 8, 2008, the WRC already possessed substantial 
credible evidence that the decision to close the facility was, at least in significant part, a 
product of ongoing animus by the company toward workers’ exercise of their 
associational rights. The WRC reported this to universities on October 10, 2008.  
 
After learning of the closure decision, the WRC undertook a rigorous process of 
additional fact gathering concerning events at the factory, in order to incorporate the most 
recent evidence into our analysis and ensure that our report to universities and colleges 
would reflect a thorough consideration of new as well as previously gathered data. As 
part of our inquiry, the WRC conducted detailed interviews with 59 current production 
workers at the factory and with three factory supervisors and reviewed dozens of relevant 
documents. The present report is based on evidence derived from these sources, as well 
as evidence gathered prior to the closure announcement, including numerous phone 
conferences and written communications with senior executives of Russell Corporation. 
 
As documented in this report, there is substantial credible evidence that animus against 
workers’ exercise of their associational rights was a significant factor in Russell’s 
decision to close Jerzees de Honduras. This is a violation of university codes of conduct – 
one that is particularly severe, since it has the effect of depriving workers of their 
livelihood in retaliation for exercising the very rights the codes are designed to protect. 
The evidence includes the timing of the closure announcement in the context of 
negotiations with the plant’s union, threats by management prior to the closure that the 
facility would close because of workers’ exercise of associational rights, admissions by 
management after the closure announcement that the decision was related to workers’ 
associational activities, and other conduct by management demonstrating continued 
hostility to workers’ exercise of their associational rights. Finally, the WRC considered 
Russell’s assertion that such animus was not a significant factor in the closure decision; 
in doing so, we took into account the company’s prior record of using such justification 
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to cloak retaliatory firings of its employees. Each of these evidentiary considerations is 
discussed at length in this report.  
 
In order to correct its breach of university codes of conduct, it is essential that Russell 
Corporation reverse its decision to close the Jerzees de Honduras facility. It is also 
essential that factory management cease threats and other acts of interference with 
workers’ exercise of associational rights and proceed to mediation in collective 
bargaining with its workers’ lawfully constituted union. The WRC’s recommendations 
for corrective actions are further articulated in the final section of this report.  
 
Background Information 
 
Because of the importance of this case, and in order to have a context for considering 
Russell’s recent announcement, it is useful to review the background to our ongoing 
focus on Russell’s labor rights practices at this plant.   
 
Jerzees de Honduras is an apparel assembly plant, located in Honduras’ Indhelva free 
trade zone, employing roughly 1,800 workers. The plant has been identified by Russell as 
a manufacturing site for university logo apparel. Unlike most other factories that 
manufacture collegiate licensed apparel, Jerzees de Honduras is directly owned and 
operated by the licensee itself, in this case, Russell Corporation, which is a U.S. company 
based in Atlanta, Georgia. Russell is a subsidiary of Fruit of the Loom, Inc.  
 
In September 2007, the WRC initiated investigations of reported labor rights violations at 
Jerzees de Honduras and a sister plant, Jerzees Choloma, also owned and operated by 
Russell and located in the same city. The investigations were launched in response to 
worker complaints that, earlier that year, Russell had responded to workers’ attempts to 
exercise the right of freedom of association, as protected under Honduran and 
international law and university codes of conduct, with mass firings aimed at destroying 
employees’ attempts to establish in-plant unions.    
 
The investigations, whose findings can be found in a WRC report published on October 
2, 2007, and in a memorandum sent to Russell on October 22, 2007, concluded that there 
was substantial credible evidence that Russell had violated workers’ right to freedom of 
association in both facilities through targeted firings of the unions’ founding members.1  
In all, the WRC found that Russell had unlawfully terminated 145 workers at the two 
plants in retaliation for their associational activities.    
 
 
 
 
1 See WRC Assessment Regarding Jerzees Choloma (“Jerzees Choloma Report”), available at: 
http://www.workersrights.org/ Freports/Jerzees_Choloma_Report_10-03-07.pdf; Memorandum from Scott 
Nova to Chris Champion Regarding Jerzees de Honduras (“Jerzees de Honduras Memo”) (Oct. 22, 2007) , 
available at: http://www.workersrights.org/Freports/WRC_Memo_re_Jerzees%20de%20
Honduras_10-22-07.pdf. 
4 
Findings and Recommendations 
Re: Jerzees de Honduras (Russell Corporation) 
November 7, 2008 
 
                                                
Russell’s campaign of repression of freedom of association at these two plants was 
among the most brazen and systematic that the WRC has ever encountered. In 
terminating the targeted employees, Russell claimed that these mass firings were merely 
economic layoffs – a general “reduction of personnel” necessitated by business 
considerations, unrelated to workers’ efforts to organize unions. The WRC’s 
investigation, however, determined that statistical evidence, the timing of the 
terminations, and the reported statements of Russell management to the fired employees 
– including threats of plant closure – all pointed to company animus against the exercise 
of freedom of association as the true motivating factor.        
 
Russell initially denied the WRC’s findings and refused to cooperate with the 
investigation, accusing the WRC of reaching biased and premature conclusions. In 
response to heavy pressure from universities, Russell commissioned its own investigation 
through the FLA, which was conducted by the global compliance firm ALGI. ALGI 
corroborated the WRC’s finding that Russell responded to workers’ exercise of freedom 
of association with mass firings of workers who had attempted to form a union.2
 
Russell, which by this point had received notices of suspension or termination of its 
license from a number of WRC affiliate universities, now decided to collaborate with the 
WRC and FLA on a remediation plan, in which the company committed to provide back 
pay and offers of reinstatement to the 145 workers whom it had dismissed unlawfully. Of 
this number, 142 workers received back pay to the date of their termination and 62 
accepted the company’s reinstatement offer. Importantly, the company also agreed to 
recognize the unions organized by workers at the two facilities as legitimate worker 
representatives.  
 
In April 2008, Russell closed the Jerzees Choloma plant; however, at the insistence of the 
WRC, the company agreed to allow all of the Jerzees Choloma workers to transfer to 
Jerzees de Honduras. Significantly, Russell, in that case, provided evidence that the 
closure, which was announced in September 2007, had been decided upon in 2006 – 
prior to any effort by the factory’s workers to exercise their associational rights. In light 
of this evidence concerning the timing of the closure decision relative to the formation of 
the union, and because of the agreement that no workers would be terminated 
involuntarily as part of the closure, the WRC decided not to pursue a full inquiry 
concerning the closure of Jerzees Choloma. 
 
The WRC continued to monitor conditions at Jerzees de Honduras, where the workers’ 
recently-recognized union, the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Jerzees de 
Honduras, S.A. (“SITRAJERZEESH”), and the labor federation to which it had affiliated, 
the Central General de Trabajadores (“CGT”), prepared for the initiation of collective 
bargaining with the company. Although Russell entered negotiations with the workers’ 
union in July 2008, the WRC continued to receive testimony from workers and union 
representatives concerning the company’s ongoing hostility toward its employees’ 
 
2 See ALGI, Final Report – Fact Finding Investigation (“ALGI Report”)(Oct. 1, 2007) at 6-10, available at: 
http://fairlabor.org/news/press_ statements#oct12. 
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exercise of associational rights. Russell’s conduct included threats of retaliatory closure 
of the plant made by local management, circulation of an anti-union petition by a factory 
supervisor, and interference with the representational activities of the workers’ union.  
 
The Plant Closure Announcement 
 
On October 8, 2008, only days after the company reached an impasse with its workers’ 
union in bargaining for a first-ever collective agreement at the plant, Russell announced 
its intention to close the Jerzees de Honduras facility, ostensibly for unrelated economic 
reasons. This announcement – which followed Russell’s assurances to the WRC less than 
two months before that the company had no plans to close the factory – immediately 
raised the concern that the decision was motivated by hostility towards workers’ exercise 
of their associational rights.  
 
Scope of Investigation and Report 
 
The purpose of the WRC’s investigation was to examine in depth whether, in light of all 
available and credible information concerning Russell’s labor rights practices, there is 
substantial evidence that animus toward the exercise of associational rights was a 
significant factor in the closure decision. In the sections below, we present and evaluate 
this evidence, state findings, and present recommendations to WRC university and 
college affiliates based on these findings.   
 
The findings made here, however, concern solely Russell’s labor rights practices. 
University codes of conduct, which it is the WRC’s responsibility to monitor, are violated 
whenever a company’s decision to close a facility is motivated, wholly or in significant 
part, by a purpose inconsistent with the fundamental labor rights these codes protect – 
even if other unrelated factors also play a role. Freedom of association is one such 
fundamental right. A finding that there is substantial credible evidence that anti-union 
animus was a significant motivating factor in the decision to close a factory demonstrates 
that a code violation has occurred, regardless of whether unrelated economic factors were 
also taken into account.  
 
Russell claims that unrelated economic reasons for reducing manufacture of Jerzees de 
Honduras’ principal product, fleece apparel, make its closure.  However, it is virtually 
impossible for any external labor rights monitoring organization to conclusively 
determine the validity of a company’s claim that a closure decision lacks hostile animus, 
when, as in this case, that decision comes after the company has repeatedly committed 
code violations that reveal such animus and has repeatedly attempted to conceal this 
animus by making false claims of a business-related justification.  
 
In this situation, it would be methodologically unsound for a labor rights monitoring 
organization to simply take that company’s claim, and evidence it selectively presents in 
support of it, at face value. Absent unfettered access to relevant corporate records and 
decision-makers, and some means of ensuring the credibility of both, the WRC cannot 
determine whether the company's current claims are valid or merely further dissembling. 
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Since Russell has not indicated its willingness to provide such access, and has not 
provided any basis for the conclusion that the company’s current claims are more 
credible than those it has proffered in the past, the WRC cannot credit Russell’s 
justification for its decision to close the Jerzees de Honduras plant. We discuss this issue 
at length later in this document. 
 
 
Sources of Evidence 
 
The WRC’s findings are based on the following sources of evidence:  
 
• Recent interviews with 59 current Jerzees de Honduras employees, including workers 
from a wide range of plant departments and both union members and workers who 
are not union members. The interviews were conducted off-site, in locations chosen 
by the employees. 
• Interviews with three “confidential,” i.e. management, employees, including two 
senior supervisors.   
• Extensive phone calls and written communications with top management of Russell 
Corporation and Fruit of the Loom.  
• A review of relevant documents, including Ministry of Labor reports, proposals and 
meeting notes from the collective bargaining sessions, and internal union records.  
• A review of relevant Honduran labor and employment law. 
• A review of prior WRC findings concerning labor rights practices at Russell facilities 
in Choloma.   
 
 
Allegations Assessed in this Report 
 
Because of the urgency of the situation concerning Russell’s announcement that it plans 
to close Jerzees de Honduras, this report focuses exclusively on one question:  
 
Was animus toward workers’ exercise of freedom of association3 a 
significant factor in Russell’s decision to close the Jerzees de Honduras 
factory? 
 
For this reason, this report examines other violations that were identified only as these 
form a basis for concluding whether or not such animus was significant factor in the 
company’s closure decision. We would note that these other allegations, if proven, would 
independently constitute violations of university codes of conduct. In such a case, Russell 
would have the responsibility to redress these violations, regardless of what remedial 
actions were required in relation to its decision to close the plant. 
 
 
 
3 Freedom of association in trade unions is a fundamental labor right protected under university codes of 
conduct, Article 469 of the Honduran Labor Code of 1959, and Conventions 87 and 98 of the ILO. 
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Findings 
 
Having extensively examined the recent developments at Jerzees de Honduras and 
thoroughly reviewed previous findings regarding Russell’s labor practices in Choloma, 
the WRC has concluded that there is substantial credible evidence that animus toward the 
exercise of associational rights was a significant motivating factor in Russell’s decision to 
close Jerzees de Honduras. As outlined in detail below, this conclusion is based on the 
following considerations:  
 
• The timing of the closure announcement, in the context of a state of impasse in 
collective bargaining with the facility’s labor union.  
• Threats and predictions by management prior to the closure announcement that the 
factory would shut down because of workers’ exercise of associational rights. 
• Admissions by management after the closure announcement that the decision was 
motivated by animus against these associational activities. 
• Other conduct and statements by local management indicating continued hostility to 
workers’ exercise of associational rights. 
• The extensive prior record of false statements by management claiming that 
retaliatory terminations of workers were the result of unrelated economic factors.   
 
 
I. Timing of the Closure Announcement
 
a. The Closure Announcement and the Collective Bargaining Process 
 
A crucial contextual element in considering Russell’s decision to close Jerzees de 
Honduras is that Russell announced its decision in the midst of negotiations with its 
workers’ union for an initial collective bargaining agreement at the plant. In particular, 
one key event in the bargaining process – the union’s declaration of impasse in 
negotiations on October 3, 20084 –  has particular significance in evaluating 
management’s statements and conduct related to the announcement of the plant’s closure 
less than a week later on October 8. 
 
From July 11, 2008, when the parties commenced contract talks, to October 3, 2008, 
when the workers’ union declared an impasse, the parties had held a series of 
approximately nine negotiating sessions. During these meetings, they completed the main 
stages of collective bargaining under the Honduran labor relations system: the 
establishment of ground-rules for negotiations and the presentation and discussion of 
contract proposals. These sessions had produced consensus on twenty-four of forty-eight 
                                                 
4 The fact that the parties had reached impasse on October 3, 2008 is documented by a statement signed on 
that date by representatives of both the union and management, stating that the parties had reached the end 
of the stage of direct negotiation in the collective bargaining process. A copy of this document is on file 
with the WRC. 
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provisions in a proposed collective agreement, but no agreement had been reached on any 
key economic issues. With respect to the central issue of workers’ base salary, the 
company’s final offer was a raise of four cents per day (0.31%) in 2009, five cents per 
day in 2010 (0.42%), and seven cents per day in 2011 (0.52%) – a sixteen cent per day 
pay raise over three years.5
 
Under Honduran labor law, once these stages of the negotiating process have been 
completed, if a tentative agreement on the contract as a whole has not been achieved, 
either party may request the Ministry of Labor to assign a mediator, who is empowered to 
direct the course of additional negotiations with the aim of helping the parties reach an 
agreement. If the ensuing process of mediation does not produce an agreement, the 
ministry can order the parties to enter into a process known as “conciliation,” in which 
each must appoint a person who was not previously involved in the negotiations to meet 
and attempt to come to an agreement. If the conciliation does not result in a collective 
bargaining agreement, workers have the legal right to declare a strike, during which the 
employer may not replace them. 
 
b. Conclusion  
 
The October 3, 2008 declaration of impasse by the workers’ union necessarily meant 
three things: First, the union had indicated unwillingness to accept Russell’s existing 
contract proposals, and, thus, a settlement might mean larger wage increases – and higher 
labor costs. Second, going forward, the Ministry of Labor would be involved in any 
further contractual negotiations with the union. Third, Jerzees de Honduras workers 
would be one step closer to gaining legal sanction and protection for a strike at the plant 
if a collective agreement was not reached. Avoiding these developments represented a 
strong motive in favor of closing Jerzees de Honduras rather than entering into mediation 
with the workers and their union. Indeed, as discussed below, the company’s senior 
negotiator indicated he would prefer to close the plant than go to mediation, a statement 
overheard by workers during a break in the final negotiating session.  
 
The timing of the company’s decision to close the Jerzees de Honduras plant is consistent 
with the timing of its previous retaliatory terminations of workers in Choloma. At both 
Jerzees Choloma and Jerzees de Honduras, earlier acts of retaliation followed close on 
the heels of actions taken by the workers and their union that had particular significance 
under Honduran labor law. Previous episodes of mass terminations in March, June, July 
and September 2007 were all immediately preceded by workers attempting to take the 
 
5 The company’s offer is outlined in a document provided to the union during the October 3, 2008 
negotiating session, a copy of which the WRC has on file. The October 31, 2008 interbank exchange rate 
was used to produce the listed figures in U.S. dollars. The company’s proposal states in its entirety (WRC 
Translation): “Each time the government of Honduras authorizes an increase in the minimum wage, the 
company agrees to adjust the fixed part of workers’ salaries above what was approved by the government, 
as follows: 2009, Lps. 0.75 per day; 2010, Lps. 1.00 per day; 2011, Lps. 1.25 per day.”  
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legally-required steps to establish an in-plant union, namely holding a founding union 
assembly and attempting to put the company on legal notice of the union’s formation.6   
 
Russell’s announcement of the factory’s closure, if carried out, will result in yet another 
mass termination of employees engaged in associational activities. Once again, the timing 
of the company’s actions closely follows a legally significant step taken by its workers in 
exercising their associational rights: in this case, the October 3, 2007 declaration that 
negotiations with the company had reached an impasse. This consistent pattern of 
important legal steps by workers and their union being followed by mass terminations is 
simply too blatant to dismiss or ignore.   
 
 
II.  Threats and Predictions of Plant Closure as a Result of Workers’ Exercise of 
Associational Rights 
 
The WRC has gathered evidence that at least nineteen members of Russell management, 
from floor-level supervisors to top corporate officials, made statements, some explicit 
and some implied, to the effect that workers’ exercise of associational rights was 
increasing the likelihood that their plant would be closed. It is important to note that this 
figure does not include numerous additional persons identified as managers, who were 
heard by workers making such threats, but whom workers could not identify by name. 
The WRC recorded seventy separate instances of such threats being made to Russell 
workers at Jerzees de Honduras, continuing from the workers’ commencement of 
associational activities in March 2007 up until the date the closure of the Jerzees de 
Honduras facility was announced in October 2008.  
 
a. Statements by Managers to Workers 
 
The vast majority of these threats and predictions were statements that managers made to 
workers indicating that the company would rather close the plant than reach a collective 
agreement with the workers’ union. For example:7 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Just as completing the steps of mediation and conciliation are required to establish a legally-protected 
right to strike under Honduran law, a union’s founding assembly and its notification of the employer are 
required to secure legally-protected status for a union’s officers and founding members. See Jerzees 
Choloma Report at 4-7, 10-13; Jerzees de Honduras Memo at 1-3. 
7 In providing examples of statements by managerial personnel in this report, we do not in all cases include 
the name of the manager or supervisor who has been identified to us as the author of the statement. Where 
we do not provide a name, it is in order to protect the confidentiality and security of witnesses.  
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• Around March 2008, a supervisor made the following statement8 during a lunch 
period in the factory cafeteria in the presence of many workers: “This factory is going 
to close because of the union…The workers will starve because they got involved 
with a union.” The supervisor also stated that “The owners will never accept a union,” 
and that “these people from the union are going to be left eating shit.” 
   
• During the same month, a management employee stated in a meeting in the plant to a 
worker, “Look, if we . . .do not accept the will of the company, what we see coming 
is that the plant will close in a very short time.” 
 
• During mid-June 2008, a supervisor told a group of six workers in the production 
department that the factory would close because of the union. The supervisor stated, 
“We are all going to be on our knees begging the Koreans [for work]” when the 
factory closes. (The comment is a reference to Korean-owned apparel factories in 
Honduras.) 
 
• On October 3, 2008, during a break in the final negotiation session between the 
company and the union prior to the announcement of the closure, several workers 
overheard Russell’s chief negotiator, who is the company’s regional head of human 
resources, Ricardo Trujillo, speaking with Jerzees de Honduras’ human resources 
administrator, Nadia Morales. As previously noted, this was the last session before 
the parties would be required to enter mediation by the Ministry of Labor. Trujillo 
was heard stating to Morales that “We are not going to go to mediation.” After stating 
this, he passed has hand by his neck as if slitting his throat. 
 
It bears repeating that the incidents cited above are merely a few examples of the literally 
dozens of such instances documented through the WRC’s inquiry.  
 
b. Statements by Managers to Supervisors 
 
Workers also reported that supervisors informed them of statements by higher-level 
managers that the company would close the plant in response to the workers’ 
associational activities: 
 
• In February 2008, a supervisor informed a worker that the plant’s general 
manager, Jose Fernandez, had said that “the company is not going to work with a 
union.” The supervisor told the worker that it would be wise to leave the factory 
now because the plant was going to close. 
  
• A supervisor told various production workers that he had attended meetings 
where higher-level managers told supervisors that the factory could be closed 
because of the union. At one such meeting around July 2008, the supervisor 
reported that the facility’s general manager stated, “The plant has high efficiency, 
 
8 All statements by Jerzees de Honduras workers and managerial personnel referenced in this report are 
translations from the original Spanish. 
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but unfortunately, because of a union, the factory may close.” The general 
manager reportedly added, “We will not even finish out the year.” 
   
• The same supervisor stated that during this series of meetings, Russell’s regional 
head of human resources, Ricardo Trujillo, said that “There is a group that is a 
group of anti-social people who are forming a union … but we are not going to 
accept this in the factory.” Several workers noted that Mr. Trujillo has overseen 
the closure of other unionized factories in Honduras in the past. 
 
• An office employee informed a worker that in a meeting in August 2008, the 
factory’s general manager, Jose Fernandez, and Russell’s regional head of human 
resources, Ricardo Trujillo, said that the company wanted to get rid of the union 
and, during the same period, circulated a petition for supervisors to sign 
confirming they agreed with this position.  
 
c. Statements by Russell to the WRC 
 
• On March 19, 2008, Russell’s General Counsel, Chris Champion, wrote to the 
WRC complaining that the activities of the workers’ union were “consistent 
neither with the best interests of the workers nor the long-term successful 
operation of the plant.”9 If the workers’ union “were legitimately interested in 
those goals,” Champion charged, it would “either commence bargaining on a 
collective agreement or move on to a company where real problems 
exist.” Champion added, “Suffice it to say that conditions today are not conducive 
to the long-term viability of the Jerzees de Honduras plant.”10   
 
The statement is striking both for the lack of substance in its criticisms of the union11 and 
for the simultaneous message that the union was harming the prospects for the plant 
staying open. First, at that time, the union was not yet legally authorized under Honduran 
law to bargain on behalf of the plant’s workers, so Champion’s complaint that it should 
“commence bargaining” was without any legitimate basis. The alternative Champion 
proposed was for the union to “move on,” i.e., for the workers to cease their associational 
activities – the very outcome Russell already had attempted to impose through illegal 
threats and firings. Apparently, then, it was the union’s presence at a plant belonging to 
Russell – rather than at “a company where real problems exist” – that was producing 
“conditions” that Champion considered harmful to the plant’s “long-term viability.” The 
statement betrays both the company’s continuing hostility toward workers’ associational 
activities and Champion’s understanding that these activities would be a factor in whether 
or not the plant would remain open.   
 
9 Email from Chris Champion to Scott Nova (March 19, 2008)(on file with the WRC).  
10 Id. 
11 While earlier in Champion’s email he mentioned an “illegal work stoppage” by the union, id., Champion 
never offered any details concerning this allegation. The claim that the union was conducting such 
concerted actions is remarkable considering that elsewhere in the same message Champion states that only 
a “small percentage of workers . . . have signed with the union.” Id. 
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• Russell’s General Counsel did state to the WRC in August 2008 that unionization 
would not be a factor in whether or not Jerzees de Honduras would close, and 
earlier, in July 2008, local management assured the workers’ union that there 
were no current plans for a shut down.12 These two statements of assurance carry 
limited weight, however, when stacked up against the dozens of threats of 
retaliatory closure that have been documented by the WRC. Isolated assurances 
given by Russell to parties whom Russell had an incentive to tell what they 
wanted to hear, are, on balance, a less reliable indicator of ongoing corporate 
policy and intent than seventy separate statements to the opposite effect, made by 
thirty-six different company managers, at various rungs of the corporate ladder. 
Russell’s failure to quell threats and predictions of retaliatory closure that, as the 
WRC had warned Champion, were being widely circulated in the plant,13 says far 
more about Russell’s motives than the company’s willingness to make an 
occasional statement to the contrary in order to assuage the concerns of outside 
parties. Moreover, Champion’s statement was in conflict with other statements by 
him, noted above, directly linking Russell’s objections to the union’s presence 
and activities to the issue of the plant’s “viability.” 
 
d. Conclusions 
 
Statements made by Russell management indicating that workers’continuing 
associational activities would lead to closure of the Jerzees de Honduras plant represent 
telling evidence of a retaliatory motive behind the company’s decision. To conclude 
otherwise is to presume that management’s prior threats to close a plant bear no relation 
to its motives for subsequently doing so. The company’s past practice in dealing with 
these workers indicates that, in Russell’s case, precisely the opposite is true. 
 
In the WRC’s investigations of previous incidents of mass terminations of workers at 
Jerzees de Honduras and Jerzees Choloma, workers recounted in detail multiple 
occasions when management threatened and predicted job loss for those who participated 
in associational activities. To cite a single example, prior to Russell’s mass firing of 
workers in June 2007, a manager told workers, “we are letting you know that if you are 
involved in the union, you are going to have problems with the company and you are not 
going to be able to find work . . .”14 Of course, as the report Russell itself commissioned 
corroborated, all of its managers’ predictions and threats were realized when Russell 
management soon after terminated these workers in retaliation for their exercise of their 
right to freedom of association.15 Similarly, as this report details, Russell managers 
repeatedly threatened and predicted the closure of Jerzees de Honduras as an outcome of 
workers’ associational activities at the plant. Russell’s recent announcement that the plant 
 
12 See email from Chris Champion to Scott Nova (July 25, 2008)(on file with the WRC). 
13 Email from Scott Nova to Chris Champion (July 15, 2008). 
14 Jerzees Choloma Report at 16. 
15 See ALGI Report at 6-10. 
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would, in fact, be closed is completely consistent with the company’s prior practice of 
threats and predictions of retaliation, followed shortly after by the retaliatory action itself. 
 
It is the case that some, though certainly not all, of the managers whom are reported to 
have made threats and predictions of retaliatory plant closure presumably lack much 
influence over Russell’s decisions in this regard. Managers in the lower rungs of a 
corporate hierarchy, however, acquire their understanding of company policies based 
upon information received from higher-ups in the organization. In this case, Russell’s 
top-level officials had ample opportunity to inform and instruct their regional and plant-
level subordinates that workers’ associational activities would not be a factor in corporate 
decision-making regarding the future of Jerzees de Honduras. Indeed, in August 2008, 
the WRC urged Russell’s General Counsel to issue such a communication, precisely 
because the WRC had received reports of such predictions and threats by management 
from the factory’s workers. The fact that the threats and predictions of retaliatory closure 
continued unabated shows that Russell did not undertake a meaningful effort to 
communicate that such conduct was contrary to its policies.    
 
Rather than reining in the managers who issued such threats, Russell has simply denied 
they were ever made. In an October 16 memorandum to universities concerning the 
closure decision, Fruit of the Loom Executive Vice-President Rick Medlin stated that “no 
member of plant management ever made threatening remarks regarding the union.”16 But 
even if one excludes the threats documented by WRC in this report, Mr. Medlin’s claim 
is patently false. Over a year ago, on October 22, 2007, the WRC communicated with 
Russell regarding mass retaliatory firings of at least twenty-five workers at Jerzees de 
Honduras17 – firings that, under pressure from universities, Russell was forced to 
remediate through back pay and offers of reinstatement. As the WRC noted at the time, 
the retaliatory nature of these terminations was clearly evidenced by threatening 
statements from Russell management expressing hostility to workers’ exercise of 
associational rights.18
 
What more recent statements by management documented in this report reveal is that 
rather than cease such retaliation, Russell management now has escalated it, raising the 
stakes to threaten job loss for not only individual workers who join a union, but, indeed, 
an entire plant’s workforce. To claim, as Russell does, that its decision to close Jerzees de 
Honduras is unrelated to such animus is to ask the universities to believe that the animus 
toward the exercise of freedom of association that has been expressed both repeatedly 
and consistently by a broad array of Russell’s management – from frontline supervisors 
to regional directors and corporate counsel19 – does not reflect the motives behind the 
company’s decisions affecting its Honduran workers. The events of the past year have 
shown, however, that the opposite is true. Russell’s claim that no such threats have 
 
16 Memorandum from Rick Medlin to College and University Licensing Representatives (“Medlin Memo”) 
(Oct. 16, 2008) (on file with WRC). 
17 See Jerzees de Honduras Memo. 
18 See id. at 3. 
19 See id.; also, Jerzees Choloma Report at 9, 14, 16, 18. 
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“ever” been made by its managers is no more credible today than it was a year ago, and 
the company does not help its credibility by persisting in denials long since shown to be 
false.   
 
III. Admissions of Retaliatory Closure  
 
Workers have testified credibly that after the closure of the plant was announced on 
October 8, 2008, various members of the plant’s management made statements that 
workers’ associational activities were the cause of the company’s decision. Such 
admissions are particularly relevant in considering the company’s motives in deciding to 
close the plant. Since the closure was announced, the WRC has gathered credible 
evidence of thirty-one separate instances, involving twenty-one members of Russell 
management, of statements to the effect that the cause for the closure was workers’ 
associational activities. A sample of these is presented below: 
   
a. Statements by Supervisors to Workers 
 
• On October 8, 2008 (the day of the closure announcement) a supervisor stated in 
the presence of a group of production workers that it was the fault of the union 
that the factory was closing. 
 
• Later, during the same week, another supervisor responded to a question from a 
worker as to the reason for closure by stating the following: “If I have five corner 
stores, and one of them is giving me problems, which one do you think I am going 
to close?” The supervisor made clear that by “problems” she meant the workers’ 
associational activities. 
 
• On October 20, 2008, the plant’s production manager, Juan Carlos Rodriguez, 
said to a group of five workers in the production department that, although the 
factory was closing, the company would be calling workers who are not members 
of the union to be hired in the company’s other factories. 
 
• On October 21, 2008, the production manager informed a group of workers in the 
training department that the factory was closing because of the union. He stated 
that workers who are not members of the union can give their names and phone 
numbers to one of the supervisors and that they would be called for jobs in the 
company’s other factories. 
 
• Also on October 21, a supervisor told a worker that “If the union didn’t exist, they 
wouldn’t be closing this factory.” 
 
• On the same day, a company instructor told a production worker, in a discussion 
concerning the closure announcement, “If I have a business, and the workers are 
pressuring me, I have to fire them.” 
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b. Statements by Managers to Supervisors 
 
A number of workers also reported statements by supervisors which indicated that 
higher-level managers had admitted to these supervisors that the closure decision was 
related to workers’ associational activities: 
 
• On October 8, 2008, the day the closure was announced, a supervisor informed a 
production worker that the regional director of human resources, Ricardo Trujillo, 
had stated earlier that day that the company would prefer to close the factory 
rather than accept the bargaining proposals of the workers’ union. According to 
the supervisor, Trujillo cited as particularly objectionable a proposal that the plant 
provide childcare facilities for workers – a benefit that is, in fact, a requirement 
under Honduran law.20 
 
• On October 14, a supervisor stated to a number of production workers that “The 
plant is going to close because the union causes too many problems.” The 
supervisor also stated the plant’s human resources administrator, Nadia Morales, 
and general manager, Jose Fernandez, had made clear to the supervisors that they 
could not accept having a collective agreement with the workers’ union. 
 
• In a similar incident on October 20, 2008, a supervisor called a department 
meeting, at which he told workers that the factory was closing because of the 
union and specifically attributed this information to General Manager Jose 
Fernandez. The supervisor stated that Fernandez had stated in meetings with 
supervisors that the company would not accept a union in any of its factories. 
 
c. Statements to WRC Staff 
 
During their investigation in Honduras, WRC staff also spoke directly, on a confidential 
basis, with three managerial employees. All are longtime employees of the factory; two 
of them supervise significant portions of the plant’s operations.  
 
• Two of these managerial employees stated with total certainty that workers’ 
decision to unionize was a significant factor in the company’s decision to close 
the facility. 
 
 
20 Article 142 of the Honduran Labor Code states: “All employers that have twenty (20) or more female 
employees are obligated to condition a space so that mothers can safely feed their children three (3) years 
and younger and so that they can leave them there during working hours under the care of a suitable person 
designated and paid for by the company. This conditioning should be simple, according to the economic 
capacity of the employer, and in accordance with the criteria and approval of the General Labor 
Inspectorate.” (WRC translation) 
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• The third managerial employee was more cautious in his assessment, but agreed 
that the closure decision may have been motivated by a desire to get rid of the 
union. 
 
d. Conclusions  
 
The numerous statements by Russell management that animus toward workers’ 
associational activities was the cause of its decision to close the plant constitute 
significant evidence that such a motive was, in fact, involved. This is particularly true 
where these statements are credibly attributed to individuals, such as the plant’s 
production manager and general manager, and the company’s regional human resources 
manager, who may be assumed to have accurate information regarding company policies 
and decisions. Moreover, as these statements were made after the company’s decision 
was publicly announced, they cannot plausibly have been attempts to bluff or intimidate 
workers. Indeed, several of the statements appear intended to reassure non-union 
employees that the plant closure is solely the result of the company’s wish to eliminate 
the union and does not reflect the company’s future business prospects as an employer.     
 
Significantly, the statements reported here offer scant support for the claim articulated by 
Russell’s Rick Medlin in a recent memorandum to universities that unrelated economic 
factors are solely responsible for its decision to close the plant.21 The company did make 
an official announcement in the plant, when notifying the workers of the closure, that its 
cause was reduced demand for the plant’s products. The overwhelming majority of 
statements reportedly made by managers to workers, however, indicated that workers’ 
associational activities, and not solely economic factors, were the cause of the closure 
decision. Indeed, some reported statements by Russell’s local supervisors and managers 
suggest that the decision to close the plant was made in spite of economic considerations 
that would otherwise favor its remaining open. For example, the plant’s general manager 
reportedly stated that despite the plant’s high efficiency, it would likely close because of 
workers’ decision to unionize.   
 
It should be noted that although many of the statements attributed to Russell management 
here represent varying degrees of hearsay, this does not mean that they lack evidentiary 
value. Admissions of improper conduct and motive are almost always found second-
hand.  Instead, the question to be considered in evaluating such an admissions is the 
credibility and knowledge of both the informant and the individual to whom the 
statement is attributed and the specificity of the testimony. The informants here are 
Jerzees de Honduras workers whose previous testimony regarding the statements and 
conduct of Russell management has been proven reliable over more than a year of 
monitoring labor practices at the company’s plants in Choloma. These workers have 
direct and regular contact with Russell management through their employment in the 
plant. The statements quoted in this report have been attributed to specific company 
supervisors or managers. In each case, they were identified as having been made in a 
specific time period and in a specific location. 
 
21 See Medlin Memo at 1. 
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Moreover, as previously noted, there is no reason to believe that the managers to whom 
these statements are attributed were attempting to mislead the employees or supervisors 
who heard them. Nor is there a basis for judging these managers to be misinformed 
themselves as to the reason for the closure. These managers presumably heard the 
company’s official announcement that the closure decision was due to flagging sales of 
the plant’s products. What the statements documented here reveal quite vividly is that this 
was not the only message they were receiving. Russell had the chance to convince its 
managers at the time the closing was announced that, as the company now claims, its 
decision was made in spite of the plant’s unionized status, and not because of it.22 It is 
telling that so many of its local and regional managers appear to have believed and 
communicated the opposite explanation.  
 
It is reasonable to presume that the statements of company managers concerning a 
company’s policies reflect, to some extent, what those policies actually are. To accept 
Russell’s claim that animus played no role in its plant closure decision – even though 
many of its own managers in Honduras repeatedly have said otherwise – is to assume that 
the opposite is true. We would, in other words, have to believe that from Russell’s 
regional human resources director down to its frontline supervisors, the company’s 
managers are somehow completely misinformed regarding the company’s real reasons for 
deciding to close the plant. Russell officials in the United States have provided no 
reasons why this should be so. To ask the university community to believe that the 
statements by management reviewed in this report do not reflect the company’s attitude 
toward workers’ associational activities is, in the face of so much prior evidence to the 
contrary, asking too much.  
 
 
IV. Continued Hostility to Associational Rights      
 
Evidence that Russell continues to be hostile to workers’ exercise of their associational 
rights constitutes additional proof that such animus was a significant motive behind the 
decision to close the plant. Even after Russell completed the process of providing back-
pay and offers of reinstatement to the 145 workers whom it had subjected to retaliatory 
termination last year, and after it formally recognized the workers’ union, the company 
persisted in conduct which indicates that management had not reconciled itself to its 
workers’ decision to unionize. Such incidents reveal that Russell continued to possess 
significant animus towards associational activities and that the company was willing to 
act upon this animus. Viewed against the backdrop of continued company hostility to 
freedom of association in the Jerzees de Honduras plant, Russell’s decision to close the 
plant appears to be the ultimate step taken by the company to ensure that union 
representation will not achieve a sustained presence in its Honduran operations.   
 
                                                 
22 See id. at 2. 
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Incidents indicating that the company’s hostile animus toward workers’ exercise of 
associational rights continued even after the formal recognition of the union in July 2008 
include the following: 
 
• Statements by management to workers and to the WRC disparaging the workers’ 
associational activities; 
• Circulation by a supervisor of a petition attacking these associational activities; 
• Interference with collective representation of the plant’s workers; 
• Restrictions on the workers’ ability to associate, through their in-plant union, with 
other labor organizations.   
 
A sample of the incidents documented by WRC staff is presented below: 
 
a. Disparagement of Associational Activities  
 
Statements to Workers: 
 
Workers testified that supervisors made numerous statements deriding the workers’ 
associational activities, of which the following are just a few examples: 
 
• Around March 2008, a supervisor said to a worker, “I never expected that you 
would be a unionist,” adding “You aren’t going to be able to find a job 
anywhere.” 
 
• In June 2008, a company instructor stated in front of a group of workers that those 
who are union members are like “villains from a movie.”  
 
• In 2008, a supervisor told a worker that all of the plant’s “problems” were the 
fault of the workers’ union and, in particular, union representative Evangelina 
Argueta. 
 
• On October 8, the day the plant’s closure was announced, a supervisor told a 
worker that “the union is only there to bother us.” 
 
•  On October 14, a supervisor was overheard saying to a worker that the union 
“just fucks things up.”  
 
Statements to the WRC and Universities: 
 
Russell corporate officials in the United States also have repeatedly expressed their view 
that the workers’ union is an unwelcome and superfluous presence at Jerzees de 
Honduras: 
 
• In a March 19, 2008 email message to the WRC, Russell General Counsel Chris -
Champion stated, concerning the decision of many workers from Jerzees 
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Choloma to take severance rather than accept positions at Jerzees de Honduras 
when the former closed, “The common reason cited for this desire is that they [the 
workers] don’t want to work in a unionized plant. I think that fact is clearly 
demonstrated by the small percentage of workers that have signed on with the 
union. Unfortunately, as you know, the laws of Honduras do not allow for an up 
or down vote on whether to unionize, so a very small minority of workers can 
unionize a facility. If such a vote were allowed, we believe it unlikely that the 
majority of our employees would choose to have a union given the environment 
we know to exist in the plants.”23  
 
• In the same email, as previously discussed, Champion also stated that the   
activities of the workers’ union are “consistent neither with the best interests of 
the workers nor the long-term successful operation of the plant.” He added 
that. “If the [union] were legitimately interested in those goals, they would either 
commence bargaining on a collective agreement or move on to a company where 
real problems exist.”24 As noted, the union was, in fact, waiting to receive legal 
authorization to commence bargaining with the company at the time. 
 
• Most recently, Fruit of the Loom Executive Vice-President Rick Medlin stated in 
an October memorandum that “the union has never achieved anything close to the 
support of a majority of workers at the JDH [Jerzees de Honduras] factory, and 
many of the non-union workers were very unhappy about the presence of the 
union.”25 
 
While the statements by Russell’s corporate officials are phrased more delicately than 
those of its factory-level supervisors, the message conveyed is remarkably consistent: the 
workers’ union is unwelcome and unnecessary at the plant and will only harm both the 
company and its employees.   
 
Two elements of the opinions expressed by these officials are particularly telling. First is 
the company’s eagerness to blame the workers’ union for resentment toward it, which 
might exist among some workers, without acknowledging Russell’s well-documented 
role in engendering this hostility in the first place. For the greater part of a year, Russell’s 
local management made clear to its employees in Jerzees de Honduras and Jerzees 
Choloma – by both word and deed – that any worker who dared associate with co-
workers in forming a union would be summarily fired.26 At the same time as it pursued 
 
23 Email from Chris Champion (March 19, 2008). Without opining on the exact percentage of employees at 
Jerzees de Honduras who support the workers’ union, the WRC would note that its staff has been 
repeatedly struck by the broad and consistent level of support the union enjoys among the plant’s workers. 
This support is remarkable given the severe and extensive repression of associational activities at the 
company’s plants. It is precisely these workers’ profound commitment to the exercise of associational 
rights, in spite of the disparagement, threats and retaliation to which they have been subjected, which 
makes this matter such a compelling challenge for the enforcement of university codes of conduct.  
24 Id. 
25 Medlin Memo at 2. 
26 See, generally, Jerzees de Honduras Memo; Jerzees Choloma Report. 
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this retaliation against individual workers, Russell management also issued well-
documented threats that these associational activities would result in plant closure. 27  
Given the company’s campaign of coercion and intimidation, it is hardly surprising that 
some employees might view these associational activities with trepidation. For Russell 
officials to ‘blame the victim’ for this situation by suggesting that the workers’ union is 
responsible for it is inappropriate, to say the least. 
 
Also telling is the sentiment expressed by Mr. Champion that it is “unfortunate” that 
Honduran law even permits workers to organize without “an up or down vote” from the 
entire workforce since, he believes, “it [is] unlikely that the majority of our employees 
would choose to have a union given the environment we know to exist in the plants.”28  
Leaving aside the fact that initial formation of an in-plant union by a minority group of 
workers is a common feature in many Latin American labor law regimes, the statement is 
disturbing in its disingenuousness. As Mr. Champion doubtless knows, under our own 
U.S. labor law system, where a majority vote is required to establish union 
representation, the notion that such a vote will fairly gauge workers’ sentiments after an 
employer has engaged in mass terminations of union supporters and blatant threats of 
plant closure is firmly rejected.29 In such circumstances, U.S. labor law recognizes that 
“laboratory conditions” for a fair vote have been effectively demolished, and serious 
remedial measures – beyond mere reinstatement of terminated employees – are often 
required before an accurate poll can be taken.30  Again, Russell’s willingness to accuse 
the workers’ union of lacking support in the plant, after having done so much to eliminate 
the union altogether, is quite revealing.  
 
b. Petition Attacking Associational Activities 
 
In August 2008, a factory supervisor led an effort to gather worker signatures on a 
petition to eliminate the union from the factory. The supervisor in question, Hugo 
Antunez, works in the plant’s shipping department. Numerous workers reported seeing 
Antunez organizing the petition drive inside the factory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 See Jerzees Choloma Report at 9, 18. 
28 Email from Chris Champion (March 19, 2008). 
29 See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 611 (1969). 
30 Id. at 612. Notably, such remedial measures can include requiring the employer to permit regular access 
to plant premises by union representatives, something Russell has been unwilling to grant at Jerzees de 
Honduras. See, e.g., Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc. v. NLRB, 97 F.3d 65, 74 (4th Cir. 1996)(upholding NLRB-
ordered “special access” remedies for union representatives at plant where employer committed extensive 
unfair labor practices).  
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Mr. Antunez and certain employees acting under his direction approached workers during 
work hours and asked them to sign a blank piece of paper, which was described as the 
signature page of a petition to rid the factory of the union. According to the report of a 
Ministry of Labor inspector who visited the factory in response to a complaint from the 
union, Antunez freely admitted circulating the petition. According to this report, dated 
August 28, 2008, he stated that he “made the personal decision to make lists of persons 
who were not in agreement with the activities the union is engaging in.”31  
 
Russell management has claimed (a) that Antunez is not a supervisor, but only a “clerk,” 
(b) that Antunez did not circulate the petition during work hours, and (c) that he acted 
completely independently. All three assertions are belied by evidence gathered by the 
WRC. According to multiple workers, Antunez is the second in command of the shipping 
department, which he directs himself when the department head is not present. Moreover, 
Mr. Antunez falls within management’s own classification system as a “confidential,” 
i.e., managerial, employee.32  
 
Both the WRC and the Labor Ministry inspector recorded credible worker testimony 
indicating that Antunez circulated the petition during work time and not solely during his 
breaks, as the company claims. One worker interviewed by the Labor Ministry stated, 
“Last week there was a day when at 10:00 in the morning I went to get a drink of water, 
and I saw that Hugo Antunez was making a list. I asked him what it was for, and he told 
me that it was a list to remove the union and he asked me if I wanted to be added, 
because it was the fault of the union that the company was going to close.”33 As 
numerous workers noted to the WRC, it would be inconsistent with the plant’s personnel 
practices for Mr. Antunez to be allowed to gather signatures on a petition during work 
time without the approval of those above him in management.  
 
Finally, the Labor Ministry inspector’s report made clear that she considered Antunez’s 
activities a violation of freedom of association by the company, and not the independent 
actions of an ordinary employee. The inspector states in her report that she “warned the 
worker Hugo Efrain Antunez of the protection of the right of association contained in 
Article 469 of the Labor Code, and that they should abstain from engaging in acts that 
attack the union.” 
 
c. Interference with Collective Representation of Workers  
 
Management has made clear through its statements and conduct that it does not recognize 
the legitimacy of the decision by the workers’ union to be represented in collective 
bargaining by the CGT, one of the three largest labor confederations in Honduras, nor 
does it respect the authority of the Honduran Ministry of Labor to police its compliance 
 
31 Labor Inspector's Report, Honduran Ministry of Labor (August 28, 2008). 
32 Under the company’s classification system, the plant has different pay periods for confidential and non-
confidential employees, with the former paid every two weeks and the latter every week. Antunez, 
according to multiple reports, is paid every two weeks.   
33 Labor Inspector's Report, Honduran Ministry of Labor (August 28, 2008). 
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with Honduran labor law. On repeated occasions factory management has interfered with 
and denied access to both the confederation’s regional representative, Evangelina 
Argueta, and inspectors from the Honduran Ministry of Labor, when they have 
attempted, respectively, to conduct ordinary representational activities and to investigate 
complaints of labor law violations. Ms. Argueta is the primary union staff person who has 
been assisting the workers. The Ministry of Labor is the main government agency dealing 
with labor law compliance. 
 
The following are examples of the company’s conduct in this regard:  
 
• Around June 17, 2008, Argueta, along with a labor inspector, visited the industrial 
park were the factory is located to deliver the union’s proposal to initiate 
collective bargaining. Upon attempting to leave the park, after delivering the 
proposal, Argueta was briefly detained, on an apparent pretext, by a zone security 
guard acting upon orders from Russell management. 
 
• In late July and early August 2008, Russell placed two workers on unpaid 
suspension for eight days for alleged disciplinary infractions. The workers 
contended that the suspensions were, in fact, retaliation for their associational 
activities. On July 31, Argueta went to Jerzees de Honduras, along with a Labor 
Ministry inspector and one of these workers, Dany Castellanos, in order to meet 
with management concerning the suspension. Both Argueta and the labor 
inspector were denied entry to the factory.  
 
• On August 6, Argueta sought to visit the factory again, along with Ms. 
Castellanos and another worker, Delmy Zelaya, who had been suspended during 
the intervening period, as well as with the union’s attorney and the same labor 
inspector. While the inspector was allowed inside the plant, both Argueta and the 
union’s attorney were denied access. In the ensuing meeting inside the plant, 
Russell management had several outside attorneys present to assist in defending 
their actions, while the suspended workers had no representation. 
 
• In late August, Argueta and a labor inspector repeatedly sought access to the 
factory to meet with management concerning the circulation of the anti-union 
petition described above. On August 25, both were denied entry by security 
personnel employed by the industrial park where the plant is located, who 
informed the two that they were acting at the direction of Russell management. 
Argueta sought to visit the plant again on August 26 and on August 28 and both 
times was denied entry. As in the case described above, in the meetings that 
ensued inside the factory, the workers involved had no outside representation, 
while management had several legal representatives present. 
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• In addition to denying Argueta access to the factory to meet with them regarding 
specific worker grievances, Russell management also has refused to allow her to 
attend monthly labor-management meetings between the in-plant union and the 
company.  
 
Russell’s refusal to allow Argueta access to the factory is striking in that it represents a 
blatant attempt by management to deny workers one of the main benefits workers often 
seek to gain through collective representation: the assistance of a professional 
representative to assist them in dealing with management in matters of discipline and 
other workplace issues. This is a benefit that Russell clearly affords itself in its dealings 
with its workers. As one worker noted, “The company is always accompanied by their 
lawyers, but we are not provided the same . . .”  
 
In both of the disciplinary matters described above, workers made specific requests to 
factory management to allow Argueta to participate in meetings with management. In 
each case, senior managers refused these requests. Indeed, the plant’s general manager, 
Jose Fernandez, stated that Argueta would not be allowed to participate because “she is 
just an adviser to you all in your office” and “doesn’t have any reason to be here” in the 
factory. Workers testified to numerous similar statements by other managers.  
 
It is clear from a communication to the WRC from Russell General Counsel Chris 
Champion that the factory’s actions in this regard are entirely consistent with corporate 
policy. Champion stated in this communication that it is Russell’s view that the union’s 
professional representatives should be excluded from assisting the plant’s workers in 
grievances – even in those cases involving serious disciplinary action. In his message of 
July 25, 2008, Champion stated the following: “We think her [Argueta’s] presence in the 
plant beyond what is required for the [contract] bargaining process is counterproductive 
and actually adds fuel to the resentment and rumors we are dealing with . . . [W]e do not 
believe that any other plant visits should generally be necessary at this time.”34 As noted, 
the company’s position that workers’ chosen representatives would only be allowed in 
the plant for contract negotiations, and for no other purpose, denies workers a key 
element of freedom of association in the workplace – the right to have the aid of the 
representative of one’s choice when one’s job is on the line.  
 
d. Restrictions on Union Affiliation 
 
Russell’s ongoing refusal to accept its workers’ full exercise of associational rights is also 
reflected in the positions taken by the company in collective bargaining with their union.  
Here, Russell has imposed on its workers its own veto power over if and when workers 
can be represented by the labor confederation to which they have chosen to affiliate their 
union.   
 
In negotiations with the company, the workers’ union proposed the recognition clause 
that is standard in Honduran collective bargaining agreements, in which a firm commits 
 
34 Email from Chris Champion to Scott Nova (July 25, 2008).  
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to dealing with both the union’s in-plant leadership and representatives of the labor 
confederation to which the union is affiliated.35 Russell rejected this language, insisting 
instead that its workers agree that the confederation will only be allowed to act as a 
representative of workers, and to participate in dialogue and negotiations with 
management, when Russell agrees to that participation.36   
 
The language that the company forced the union to accept violates basic principles of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, as enshrined in Conventions 87 and 98 
of the International Labour Organization. The language Russell demanded is contrary to 
the principles of collective bargaining which is premised on negotiation between two 
parties – labor and management – each of whom selects their own representatives. Here, 
instead, Russell has insisted that it must possess veto power over whom workers may 
choose to represent them and under what circumstances. The result is no more compatible 
with free bargaining between two parties than if the union were able to decide whether or 
not Russell should be allowed to avail itself of representation by outside attorneys. 
 
By its very nature, such a rule also restricts freedom of association because it prevents a 
group of workers from being represented by and drawing on the representational skills of 
a larger labor organization to which they have chosen to affiliate. One of the key reasons 
why such federations are formed is so that individual unions and their members can have 
access to resources – such as full-time professional representation – that they cannot 
afford on their own.   
 
Russell’s position on this issue is revealing because it shows that the company was only 
willing to accept freedom of association and collective bargaining by its employees if it 
could restrict and control their exercise of these rights. Viewed in this light, the 
declaration of impasse in contract negotiations at the plant is particularly significant, 
because it signaled that there was a limit to how far workers would permit the company 
to dictate the terms of the collective bargaining relationship. As a result, the timing of the 
 
35 The workers’ union proposed the following language for the collective bargaining agreement with 
Jerzees de Honduras on July 14, 2008: “The company JERZEES DE HONDURAS S.A. de C.V. recognizes 
the JERZEES DE HONDURAS WORKERS' UNION ‘SITRAJERZEESH’ as the one and only legal 
representative of the workers affiliated to the union . . . and commits to dealing with the Leadership 
Committee, union delegates and representatives of the Federation or Central Organization to which the 
union is affiliated on all of the individual and collective conflicts that result from the application of this 
collective bargaining agreement of the working conditions, internal working regulations and other labor 
laws in the country, without prejudicing the right of all workers to negotiate directly with regards to the 
problems that individually affect them.” (WRC Translation) 
36 The recognition language that Russell insisted upon is the following: “The company JERZEES DE 
HONDURAS S.A. de C.V. recognizes the JERZEES DE HONDURAS WORKERS' UNION 
"SITRAJERZEESH" as the one and only legal representative of the workers affiliated to the union . . . and 
commits to dealing with the Leadership Committee on all of the individual and collective conflicts that 
result from the application of this collective bargaining agreement of the working conditions, internal 
working regulations and other labor laws in the country, without prejudicing the right of all workers to 
negotiate directly with regards to the problems that individually affect them. The representative(s) of the 
federation or confederation to which Sitrajerzees is affiliated will be invited to participate in the solution of 
complaints or internal conflicts when merited by the severity of the issue or when there is mutual 
agreement of the parties, company and union.” (WRC Translation, italics added) 
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plant closure announcement, only a week after impasse was declared, appears even more 
significant as an indication of the company’s motives.     
 
e. Conclusion 
 
In his memorandum to universities dated October 16, 2008, Fruit of the Loom’s Rick 
Medlin asserts that in deciding whether to close the Jerzees de Honduras plant, the 
company considered the “presence of the union” as a factor in favor of keeping the plant 
open.37 The acts and expressions of hostility that are detailed above flatly contradict any 
claim that Russell has adopted such an orientation towards associational activities by its 
employees. It is simply incredible to suppose that a company would, on the one hand, 
consider the presence of a union as a factor favoring keeping a plant open, while at the 
same time (1) its local management continues to undermine and heap abuse upon the 
union and its members; (2) its company policy is to refuse to permit the union’s 
representatives to set foot on its premises to carry out legitimate union business; and (3) 
its general counsel implies that it is “unfortunate” that the laws of Honduras are such that 
it must deal with the union at all.   
 
Mr. Medlin brushes such evidence away, describing any hostility toward the union in the 
plant as reflecting the fact that “the union has never achieved anything close to the 
support of the majority of the workers, and many of the non-union workers were very 
unhappy about the presence of the union.”38 None of the persons responsible for the 
hostile acts and statements detailed in this report, however, were simply “non-union 
workers” opposed to the presence of a union in the plant. The statements, policies, and 
bargaining positions detailed in this report are all those of Russell management – the 
same management that claims to have considered the presence of a union as a point “in 
favor” of a plant remaining open. Moreover, the determinative issue in this inquiry is not 
the feelings of “non-union workers” regarding the union, but the feelings – and conduct – 
of Russell management concerning workers’ exercise of associational rights. Russell 
management’s continued displays of hostility towards the workers’ union supports the 
conclusion that the same animus is present in the company’s other recent decision-
making, including the decision to close the Jerzees de Honduras plant. 
 
 
V. The Credibility of Russell’s Claims Concerning the Reasons for the Closure 
 
As outlined in the preceding four sections of this document, there is voluminous credible 
evidence that Russell has continued to harbor strong animus against workers’ exercise of 
their associational rights at Jerzees de Honduras and that this animus was a significant 
factor in the company’s decision to close the factory and terminate the workers.  
 
Russell, however, asserts that anti-union animus was not a factor and that the closure 
decision is related solely to economic considerations – namely, reduced demand for the 
                                                 
37 Medlin Memo at 2. 
38 Id. 
26 
Findings and Recommendations 
Re: Jerzees de Honduras (Russell Corporation) 
November 7, 2008 
 
                                                
plant’s current product, fleece apparel. In his memo to universities, Fruit of the Loom’s 
Rick Medlin has indicated the company’s willingness to make some internal information 
available to outside parties on a confidential basis to substantiate this assertion.39  
 
The WRC has sought to determine what evidentiary weight it is appropriate to grant 
Russell’s assertions, relative to the evidence summarized above. We have also considered 
the value of Russell’s offer of evidence. We address these two related points in this 
section. 
 
In order to determine the evidentiary value of Russell’s claim that the closure decision 
was not retaliatory, but was instead motivated by economic considerations, it is necessary 
to evaluate Russell’s credibility. Russell has an extensive track record in this regard and it 
is one with which the WRC and the university community are familiar. Specifically, 
Russell has 1) terminated workers on multiple occasions who were engaged in efforts to 
exercise their associational rights, and 2) advanced the claim at the time of these 
terminations that they were undertaken purely for business reasons wholly unrelated to 
workers’ union activities. It is important to note that these terminations and the 
justifications for them involve many workers who currently are facing termination at 
Jerzees de Honduras. As outlined below, these claims of economic motives uniformly 
proved to be false. 
 
Below, we briefly review these prior claims by Russell that terminations of employees 
involved in associational activities at Jerzees de Honduras and Jerzees Choloma40 were 
actually motivated by unrelated economic considerations.  
 
 
 
 
39 Id.  
40 Russell has charged that the WRC with imposing a double standard, because, supposedly, the WRC 
accepted the company’s evidence supporting its claim of an economic justification for the earlier closure of 
Jerzees Choloma, but will not accept at face value the company’s claimed economic basis for closing 
Jerzees de Honduras.  The assertion Russell makes now, however, is fundamentally different in both 
substance and implications than the one it advanced in the earlier case.   
 The key distinction is one of timing. Russell asserted that its decision to close Jerzees Choloma 
was made in October 2006, months before associational activities commenced at the plant. Thus, unless 
one uncovered a basis to question the authenticity of document the company produced, the timing of the 
closure decision meant that anti-union animus could be ruled out as a motive. 
 By contrast, in the case of Jerzees de Honduras, the timing of the closure decision is a factor that 
weighs in favor of a finding of retaliatory animus. In this case, it is well-documented that the company 
made its decision to close Jerzees de Honduras after it had conducted an extensive and severe campaign of 
retaliation against workers’ associational activities. See Jerzees de Honduras Memo; Jerzees Choloma 
Report.     
 In addition, the implications of closing Jerzees de Honduras are far different. In the closure of 
Jerzees Choloma, Russell, at the urging of the WRC, agreed to offer positions at Jerzees de Honduras to 
any and all of the employees who faced job loss as a result. In addition, Russell had already recognized an 
in-plant workers’ union at Jerzees de Honduras. Therefore, the closure of Jerzees Choloma did not pose 
significant harm to either workers’ livelihood or to their continuing ability to engage in associational 
activities. Russell has given no comparable assurances in regard to Jerzees de Honduras. 
27 
Findings and Recommendations 
Re: Jerzees de Honduras (Russell Corporation) 
November 7, 2008 
 
                                                
a. Record of Claiming Business Justifications for Retaliatory Terminations 
 
• On March 19, 2007, Russell terminated nine workers who were founding 
members of the workers’ union at Jerzees Choloma, claiming that the firings were 
merely a ‘reduction of personnel,’ i.e., an economic layoff. The WRC later 
determined that the economic justification tendered by the company was false.41   
 
• On March 22 and 23, 2007, Russell terminated five more workers who were 
among those attempting to re-found the workers’ union at Jerzees Choloma. 
Again, Russell claimed that the terminations were business-related layoffs. The 
WRC’s subsequent investigation determined that the company’s economic 
justification in this case was false as well, and that the terminations were 
retaliatory in nature.42 
 
• On June 6, 2007, Russell fired yet another worker who was a founding member of 
the newly-formed union at Jerzees Choloma, again asserting that the terminations 
were business-related. Here again, the WRC later found that this economic 
justification was an attempt to cover-up retaliatory action.43 
 
• Between June 7 to 14, 2007, Russell terminated approximately sixty  more 
workers who were founding members of the in-plant union, claiming, in nearly all 
of these cases, that the company’s action was part of a purely business-related 
layoff. As in the previous cases, the WRC’s subsequent investigation determined 
that the terminations were, in fact, retaliatory.44  
 
• On July 10, 2007, Russell terminated ten workers who were founding members of 
the union at Jerzees de Honduras. Here, as well, the company claimed that the 
terminations were part of a general layoff. The WRC’s investigation, however, 
determined that the justification given by Russell was false, and that the 
terminations were retaliatory.45 
 
• Around July 17, 2007, Russell terminated nine more workers at Jerzees de 
Honduras who were founding union members. The company’s claim that the 
terminations were an economic layoff were shown to be false.46 
 
• Around July 24, 2007, Russell terminated six more Jerzees de Honduras workers 
who were founding union members. Despite the company’s claim at the time that 
 
41 See Jerzees Choloma Report at 6. 
42 See id.  
43 See id. at 6, 8-9. 
44 See id. at 7. 
45  See Jerzees de Honduras Memo at 2. 
46 See id. 
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the terminations were business-related, the WRC determined that, in fact, the 
company’s actions were retaliatory.47  
 
• On September 14, 2007, Russell terminated twenty-two more workers from the 
Jerzees Choloma plant who were founding union members engaged in a third 
attempt by workers to form a union at the plant. Once again, Russell’s 
justification for the terminations was that they were part of a business-related 
layoff. Here too, the company’s claim was later determined by WRC to be an 
attempt to conceal the retaliatory nature of the terminations.48 
 
In sum, in eight separate instances, involving well over one hundred terminations, the 
company fired workers with retaliatory motives and made claims of economic 
justification that proved to be false. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that in the case of the mass terminations of workers at 
Jerzees Choloma, the company’s conduct was also the subject of a separate investigation 
commissioned by Russell itself through the FLA and conducted by the firm ALGI.  That 
investigation corroborated the WRC’s finding that the terminations in question were 
retaliatory in nature, rather than due to other business considerations.49 Moreover, in all 
of the incidents highlighted above, exposure of the retaliatory motive behind the 
terminations and the pretextual nature of the company’s justifications ultimately resulted 
in the company agreeing to offer back-pay and reinstatement to the workers. Thus, 
Russell’s record of retaliatory firings, and its record of using false claims to hide the true 
motive for those firings, has been confirmed not only by the WRC, but by ALGI and by 
the actions of the company itself. With its recent announcement that it intends to close 
Jerzees de Honduras, Russell once again has advanced the claim that business reasons 
unrelated to retaliatory animus justify a “reduction of personnel,” one that, this time, will 
be achieved through the termination of all the plant’s workers, not just union members. 
 
In light of Russell’s track record with respect to such claims, the company cannot be 
regarded as having any credibility on these matters. Therefore, Russell’s verbal and 
written assurances that the closure of Jerzees de Honduras was motivated by economic 
factors cannot, in and of themselves, be granted any evidentiary weight.  
 
b. Russell’s Offer of Limited Access to Internal Records Selected by the Company 
 
In addition to its verbal and written assertions, Russell offers to provide limited access to 
some internal company documents relevant to this issue – “certain information bearing on 
the closure decision,” in Mr. Medlin’s words.  
 
As amply detailed in this report, substantial credible evidence supports the conclusion 
that company conduct motivated by anti-union animus continued up to, and included, 
 
47 See id. at 3. 
48 See Jerzees Choloma Report at 14. 
49 See ALGI Report at 6-10. 
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Russell’s decision to close the plant. This means that even if information Russell provides 
to outside parties concerning the closure shows that economic considerations were a 
factor involved in this decision, the evidence that retaliatory animus also was a 
significant factor would still constitute proof of a violation of university codes of 
conduct. As we have noted, workers’ associational rights are violated if their decision to 
exercise those rights is a significant factor in a decision to terminate their employment, 
even if other factors are also involved.  
 
The burden is therefore upon Russell to prove not merely that economic factors were 
considered, but that these were the only factors which played a significant role in its 
decision – that the company would have made the same decision even if animus toward 
workers’ associational rights did not exist, in any portion of the company. In order to do 
this, Russell would, at a minimum, have to demonstrate that the closure of Jerzees de 
Honduras is by a clear margin the most economically advantageous course presently 
available to the company relative to all other options for effecting the reduction in 
manufacturing capacity that Russell claims it must undertake.  
 
This is, appropriately, a high burden of proof and it is one that cannot possibly be met by 
the level of access to relevant evidence that Russell has offered. Conceivably, the 
company could meet the burden of proof if it agreed to an unrestricted and transparent 
inquiry, where all relevant information could be brought to light. However, Russell has 
not proposed such an inquiry. Instead it has offered to provide only limited access to 
documents selected by the company – in effect asking monitoring organizations and the 
university community to trust that the information provided represents a fair, accurate, 
and complete record of relevant economic issues and the decision-making process. 
 
No reasonable fact-finder would ignore Russell’s history of false statements in judging 
the likelihood that any information now provided by Russell is complete, accurate, and 
objective. Nor is there any viable means for a party given access to information selected 
at Russell’s sole discretion to independently verify its accuracy, or to determine whether 
there is any information that is not being provided, or to ascertain what considerations 
may have been acted upon but not written down. Given Russell’s amply demonstrated 
willingness to misrepresent facts in order to hide the actual reasons for terminating 
workers, a body of corporate documents chosen at Russell’s discretion cannot reasonably 
be regarded as credible exculpatory evidence, much less can it be seen as having greater 
evidentiary weight than the extensive credible evidence of anti-union motivation 
reviewed in this report. The WRC therefore sees no probative value in pursuing an 
inquiry based on the limited information Russell has said it is willing to provide.  
 
Proving that unrelated business considerations were the only factors in the decision to 
close Jerzees de Honduras would require Russell to permit a complete and unrestricted 
inquiry into company decision-making on this issue. This would necessarily involve 
unfettered access to both company records and testimony by company decision-makers, 
in a process that is transparent and open to review by all concerned parties. Russell may 
well have valid business reasons for not wanting to expose itself to such a wide-ranging 
and intensive inquiry. However, given the company’s track record of retaliatory firings 
30 
Findings and Recommendations 
Re: Jerzees de Honduras (Russell Corporation) 
November 7, 2008 
 
cloaked in false claims of economic necessity, Russell should not be surprised if, absent 
such an inquiry, its claim of a business justification for the closure decision is greeted 
with skepticism. 
 
It is important to understand in this regard that the high burden of proof the company 
faces is a product of its own actions. If Russell did not have a track record of repeatedly 
using claims of economic necessity as a pretext for carrying out unlawful retaliatory 
firings, its assertions of lawful motives in the present case would have some degree of 
credibility. If Russell had not continued to demonstrate hostility toward workers’ exercise 
of their association rights throughout the period leading up to the closure, if Russell 
managers and supervisors had not during this same period repeatedly threatened that 
workers’ union activities would lead to closure, and if managers and supervisors had not 
stated after the fact that the closure was motivated by the presence and actions of the 
union, then Russell would not be in the position of having to prove that all of this 
evidence of animus was unrelated to the closure decision.  
 
c.  Conclusion  
 
As this report details, the WRC has gathered substantial credible evidence indicating that 
retaliatory animus toward workers associational activities was a significant factor in 
Russell’s decision to close the Jerzees de Honduras. Now, Russell asks the university 
community to ignore this evidence and accept the company’s claims that unrelated 
economic considerations were, in fact, solely responsible for its decision.   
 
It is unreasonable for the company to proffer the same excuse that has been exposed as 
false in incident after incident, and to offer in support of its claims only incomplete 
evidence without meaningful transparency, and to then expect the university community 
to accept these measures as an adequate good faith response. We find, on the contrary, 
that the company’s past false statements represent a reason to conclude that its current 
denial of retaliatory motives is similarly unreliable and that its claims of business 
justification should not be taken at face value. We further conclude that Russell has failed 
to offer anything approaching the degree of transparency that would be required for there 
to be a realistic prospect that the company’s claims concerning economic justification 
could be verified.  
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Recommendations  
 
In light of the findings detailed above, the WRC offers the following recommendations: 
 
 
I. The Plant Closure Announcement and Decision 
 
The WRC recommends that Russell Corporation to take the following remedial action, 
without delay:  
 
• Reverse its decision to close the Jerzees de Honduras facility. For the reasons 
described in detail in this report, the closure of the facility and the consequent 
dismissal of its approximately 1,800 employees represent a severe violation of 
international labor standards, national law, and university codes of conduct. The only 
course of action that would correct this violation is the reversal of the closure decision 
and the continued operation of the facility.   
 
• Provide offers of reinstatement to any workers who have been laid off as part of the 
phased dismissal of the plant’s employees related to the closure. Provide back pay to 
these workers since the date of their departure from the facility.  
 
 
II. Other Conduct Interfering with Freedom of Association 
 
Threats, harassment, and interference with collective representation, in addition to being 
strong evidence supporting the conclusion that anti-union animus played a role in the 
closure decision, are in and of themselves serious violations of workers’ freedom of 
association. Assuming reversal of the closure decision and the continued operation of the 
plant, additional actions are necessary to address these violations.  
 
Such corrective action, however is only meaningful if the closure is averted. Reversal of 
the closure decision is necessary to and facilitates remediation of other violations in the 
plant. Assuming the closure is reversed, necessary corrective actions by the company 
include:  
 
• Cessation of management and supervisor harassment of workers concerning workers’ 
associational activities. Discipline of managers and supervisory personnel who have 
engaged in threats and harassment of workers in relation to unionization. 
 
• Cessation of acts of interference with workers’ decisions concerning collective 
representation. Specifically, recognition of the affiliation of the workers’ union to the 
labor confederation Central General de Trabajadores, engagement in good faith 
dialogue and negotiations with representatives of the latter, in any instances where the 
workers’ union seeks its representation or counsel on workplace issues.  
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• Issuance of a statement to the workforce, both verbally and in writing, stating that 
Russell Athletic and Fruit of the Loom respect workers’ right to engage in 
associational activities, including joining a union; that no worker in these companies’ 
employ will ever suffer retaliation or discrimination as a result of his or her decision 
to engage in such activities; that a decision by workers to unionize will not cause any 
factory to close or have any impact on any decision concerning factory closures; and 
that these companies will negotiate a collective bargaining agreement, in good faith, 
and without delay, with SITRAJERZEESH, the union duly constituted under 
Honduran law to represent workers at Jerzees de Honduras. It bears noting that 
Jerzees Choloma issued such a statement in 2007; however, such actions are of little 
value if they are subsequently contradicted by the company’s actions.   
 
• Engage in mediation under the auspices of the Honduran Ministry of Labor, along 
with the workers’ union and their selected representatives, including staff or officers 
of the CGT labor confederation. As noted above, given the current impasse in 
collective bargaining between the parties, mediation is the next step in the Honduran 
industrial dispute resolution system.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As this report has discussed in depth, the WRC has gathered substantial credible 
evidence, which supports the conclusion that animus toward workers’ associational 
activities was a significant factor in Russell’s decision to announce the closure of Jerzees 
de Honduras. This conclusion is based on the following findings of fact, which emerged 
from extensive on-the-ground research, including more than sixty interviews with 
company employees:  
 
• First, the closure announcement was made only days after the workers’ union 
declared an impasse in negotiations with the company for a first ever collective 
agreement at the plant. As a result, the closure announcement had the effect of 
heading off several developments: (a) the requirement that the company enter 
government-led mediation of the contract dispute, (b) the prospect of an eventual 
legally-protected strike by its workers, and (c) continued negotiation with an in-
plant union that had signaled it would not simply submit to the company’s 
existing bargaining positions. 
 
• Second, leading up to the closure announcement, according to credible worker 
testimony, company managers, from Russell’s regional human resources director 
on down, on seventy separate occasions, made statements to the effect that the 
company was not willing to accept a permanent collective bargaining agreement 
with the workers’ union and a permanent union presence, and would sooner close 
the plant than do so.   
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• Third, since the closure announcement, according to credible worker testimony, a 
number of the same managers made statements admitting that such animus was 
responsible for the company’s decision to close the plant. Workers testified to 
thirty-one separate instances of such statements being made over the two week 
period following the closure announcement.    
 
•  Fourth, Russell management, from frontline supervisors to corporate officials 
have, in recent months, engaged in statements and conduct that clearly 
demonstrate ongoing hostile animus towards workers associational activities and 
rejection of the presence of the workers’ union at the plant. 
 
• Fifth, the company’s track record of falsely advancing business justifications as 
an excuse for retaliatory terminations of workers makes it impossible to credit its 
claim that unrelated business factors were responsible for the closure decision 
   
Our overall conclusion – that anti-union animus was a significant factor in the company’s 
decision to close the plant – has important implications for universities and colleges that 
have a licensing relationship with this company. If Russell’s current plan to close Jerzees 
de Honduras is carried out, it will do irreparable harm to the plant’s employees – many of 
whom have already been targets of a particularly egregious campaign of retaliation by the 
company.  
 
If the plant closes, many of these workers will very likely be blacklisted from finding 
new jobs in the apparel industry. The systematic blacklisting of workers who are union 
supporters in Honduras, and the Choloma region in particular, is well known.50 When 
Russell conducted its mass firings of workers from Jerzees Choloma in 2007, many of 
these workers were threatened with blacklisting before the firings, and, indeed, the WRC 
found some evidence that Russell had followed through on these threats after they were 
terminated.51 Other former Jerzees Choloma workers, who choose not to transfer to 
Jerzees de Honduras, also testified to the WRC that they have been unable to find work in 
the apparel industry, despite their skills and extensive experience.   
 
One of the gravest potential consequences of the closure decision is violence against 
workers who have led efforts to exercise associational rights at the facility. Worker 
leaders have been subjected to repeated threats of violence in relation to the factory’s 
closure. The in-plant union’s president has twice returned to his machine after lunch 
break to find anonymous notes stating, “You're going to die because it is your fault, your 
fault that the factory is closing” (“Te vas a morir, porque por culpa tuya, por culpa de 
vos está cerrando la empresa”). Since the closure announcement, threatening graffiti has 
also been seen in the plant’s restrooms. A message on the men’s restroom wall stated, 
“We're going to put an AK-47 in the [union] president's chest.” (“Al presidente le vamos 
a poner una AK-47 en el pecho.”). Another message directed to the union’s president 
 
50 See Jerzees Choloma Report at 17. 
51 See Jerzees Choloma Report at 9, 17. 
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stated, “By God, we're going to cut off your head.” (“Por Dios que te vamos a volar la 
cabeza.”)   
 
To be clear, the WRC has seen no evidence to indicate that company management played 
any role in the issuance of these threats. According to worker testimony, however, 
Russell’s response to the threats has been to tell the workers who have received them that 
they are free to resign from the factory or take leave. The suggestion that it is the victims 
of these threats who should leave the plant, however, rather than the perpetrators, is 
inappropriate. Such a result would merely embolden the perpetrators to threaten other 
workers in the same manner. Instead, Russell must investigate such threats, discipline and 
assist in the prosecution of any issuer of such a threat who can be identified, and send a 
clear message that such conduct will not be tolerated. 
 
While all employers have a responsibility to maintain security in the workplace, Russell 
should be particularly attentive to this issue now. The company’s repeated statements to 
workers that they will lose their jobs because of other workers’ associational activities 
have contributed to the creation of the climate in which the threats against the worker 
leaders occurred. Given management’s statements that the union would cause, and has 
caused, the factory to close and the workers to lose their jobs, such threats were 
predictable. It is also important to understand that in the Honduran context, such threats 
are credible.52 Given the clear message conveyed by management for more than a year to 
the effect that blame for the plant’s closure will lie with the union’s leaders, the risk of 
violence that these workers now face may only be reversed with a reversal of the closure 
decision.  
The closure decision, if carried out, will also have a severe chilling effect on the ability of 
workers throughout Russell's supply chain, and the university-licensed apparel sector in 
this region in general, to exercise their associational rights. If not reversed, the closure 
decision will demonstrate to workers that there is no point in filing complaints about 
violations of their rights, because even if labor rights monitors can compel a company to 
end violations temporarily, the company can simply wait a few months and then shut 
down the factory. It will, likewise, show employers, that they may act with impunity in 
repressing associational rights, so long as, at the end of the day, they are prepared to 
exercise the “scorched earth” option of retaliatory plant closure.   
Finally, a factory that workers and worker organizations in Honduras have viewed as a 
harbinger of progress toward meaningful respect for basic labor rights in that country will 
instead be seen as convincing proof that codes of conduct and monitoring programs offer 
only false hope to workers. Future university code enforcement efforts in Honduras, and 
throughout the region, will be significantly undermined. Workers and worker advocates 
 
52 On April 24, 2008, Rosa Altagracia Fuentes, the General Secretary of the Honduran trade union 
confederation, Confederación de Trabajadores de Honduras, trade union leader Virginia García de Sánchez 
and motorcyclist Juan Bautista Gálvez were murdered after returning from a meeting concerning a factory 
closure. The crime remains unsolved. Their murders represent only one incident in a recent rise of violence 
against trade union leaders in Central America.  
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in these countries will conclude that the commitment to labor rights articulated in 
university codes is merely theoretical, rather than real. This would be a tragic outcome to 
a case that was, thanks to universities’ intervention last year, a bright spot in the 
landscape of code of conduct enforcement. 
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